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BEYOND CONSERVATION: EXCESSIVE
LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL
FISHING IN CHERENZIA V. LYNCH
Hillary Bouchard*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cherenzia v. Lynch,' several commercial fishermen filed suit to
challenge the constitutionality of a Rhode Island statute that prohibits the
use of a self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA) to harvest
shellfish at four coastal ponds in the state.2 On cross motions for summary
judgment, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion and the State3 filed
a timely appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.4 The supreme court
was asked to address whether the fishermen's equal protection and due
process rights were infringed upon by the statute;' it found in the negative
and reversed the decision of the trial court.6
The appeal, however, provided the supreme court with a critical
opportunity to control the Rhode Island General Assembly's regulation of
"rights of fishery."7 The supreme court's decision deferred to the General
Assembly, interpreting the "rights of fishery"8 to be for the "benefit of the
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2006.
1. 847 A.2d 818 (R.I. 2004).
2. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-6-30 (2004).
3. Patrick Lynch, as Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island.
4. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 821.
5. "The equal protection inquiry generally asks whether there is a rational basis for a
statutory classification, while the substantive due process test is whether 'the government
action is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI,
STATE ENvIRoNMENTAL LAW § 5.15, 1 (2004) (quoting La. Seafood Mgmt. Council v.
Wildlife and Fisheries Comm'n, 719 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 1998)).
6. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 820.
7. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
8. The right of fishery is defined as "the right of persons to fish in public waters, subject
to federal and state restrictions and regulations, such as fishing seasons, licensing, and catch
limits." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 668 (8th ed. 2004).
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people of the state and not merely for the profit and emolument of the
fisherman engaged in the business."9 Therefore, the decision cemented the
public policy that fishery resources are to be shared equally between
commercial fishermen and recreational fishermen. The question now
becomes: should the court be less deferential to the legislature when fishery
regulations lack a solid conservation basis and have the potential to
negatively impact the livelihood of commercial fishermen?
This Note considers whether state legislatures should statutorily alter
the methods which commercial fishermen can employ, especially when
significant environmental concerns are absent. In addition to reviewing the
history of deference given to states in regulating their respective fishing
industries, this Note suggests there is a developing rift between citizens
who fish for recreation and sport, and citizens who fish for a living.
Moreover, this Note will demonstrate that other states besides Rhode Island
are leaning towards a tendency of tight control over commercial fishing in
the name of resource allocation. After weighing these considerations, the
Note concludes that the decision in Cherenzia v. Lynch will open the door
for the Rhode Island General Assembly and other state legislatures to
unfairly regulate their fisheries, resulting in a drastic cut in the prosperity
of commercial fishermen.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER FISHING RIGHTS
Generally, states are able to regulate the fisheries in their respective
jurisdictions."0 In 1891, the United States Supreme Court declared that "a
state can define its boundaries on the sea" subject to the approval of
Congress." In 1877, the Supreme Court had declared that each state
controlled the beds of all tide-waters within its borders, as well as the fish
9. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 824 (quoting Opinion to the Senate, 137 A.2d 525,
526 (R.I. 1958)).
10. 35A AM. JuR. 2D Fish, Game, and Wildlife Conservation § 35 (2004), construing
State v. Mallory, 83 S.W. 955 (Ark. 1904); Sheehan v. All Persons, 234 P. 1113 (Cal. 1925);
Commonwealth v. Sisson, 75 N.E. 619 (Mass. 1905); Winous Point Shooting Club v.
Slaughterbeck, 117 N.E. 162 (Ohio 1917); State v. Savage, 184 P. 567 (Or. 1919); State v.
Kofines, 80 A. 432 (R.I. 1911); Tuttle v. Wood, 35 S.W.2d 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930);
State v. Southern Coal & Transp. Co., 76 S.E. 970 (W. Va. 1912).
11. Manchester v. Commonwealth, 139 U.S. 240, 264 (1891) (upholding the conviction
of a fisherman for use of a purse seine while fishing in Massachusetts Bay in violation of
state law and basing the decision on precedent that allowed the state to regulate fisheries
close to its shores in the absence of conflicting federal congressional action).
Cherenzia v. Lynch
in them.' 2 Today, the state boundary is typically set three miles off of the
shoreline. '
The great power given to the state today in the broad regulation of
natural resources exhibits residual concepts of this nineteenth century
policy, where legally the state was the "owner of animals ferae naturae, in
trust for its people, and had more or less complete authority to regulate fish
and game as it saw fit."' 4 The more recent use of the term "ownership" by
the state is not in the traditional sense, but geared towards the state's
responsibility to conserve fisheries and prevent their depletion. 5
Rhode Island in particular has a long history of relatively unbridled
legislative regulation. An argument that the legislature cannot restrict
citizens' access to state fisheries has been flatly denied by the Rhode Island
12. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394-395 (1877) (upholding the conviction of a
non-resident for planting oysters in a Virginia river and reaching its decision on the
established premise that the state owns such property and has the right to regulate that
property as it wishes).
13. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923). See also Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69 (1923).
14. Annotation, Constitutionality of State Laws Which Discriminate Against Non-
residents or Aliens as to Fishing and Hunting Rights, 52 L. ED. 2D 824, § 2 (2004). This
view was espoused by the Court in McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
15. Annotation, supra note 14, § 2. In addition, a large majority of state legislation is
aimed at aliens and/or non-residents. Id. The courts have recently struck down many
statutes restricting out-of-state fishermen on the basis of state "ownership" theories. See
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948):
The State is not without power, for example, to restrict the type of equipment used in
its fisheries, to graduate license fees according to the size of the boats, or even to
charge non-residents a differential which would merely compensate the State for any
added enforcement burden they may impose or for any conservation expenditures
from taxes which only residents pay. We would be closing our eyes to reality, we
believe, if we concluded that there was a reasonable relationship between the danger
represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe discrimination practiced upon
them.
Id. at 398-399 (citations omitted); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410,421
(1948) ("we think that 'ownership' is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a living by fishing in the ocean off
its shores while permitting all others to do so."); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415,417-
419 (1952) ("something more is required than bald assertion" in imposing higher fees on
non-resident fishermen); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 283-285 (1977)
(invalidating a statute restricting the fishing of menhaden by people from out of state under
a justification of conservation, while making no efforts to control the fishing by state
residents).
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Supreme Court. 6 Case precedent from 1910 describes plenary legislative
power:
It is for the Legislature to make such laws, regulating and govern-
ing [fisheries], as they deem expedient .... They may withhold
from the public use such natural oyster beds, clam beds, scallop
beds, or other fish beds as they may deem desirable .... We find
no limitation, in the Constitution, of the power of the General
Assembly to legislate in this regard, and they may delegate the
administration of their regulations to such officers or boards as
they may see fit.'7
The notion that the individual citizen's right to fish is under unfettered
regulation by the legislature was not a new one. Since at least the mid-
nineteenth century, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has upheld regulation
under the stated goal of "[reserving] to the public the greatest benefit."'"
Many of the coastal states have also opened up a door for increased
regulation of fishing by declaring it is not a fundamental right of its
citizens. Texas and Florida are two of these states.'9 California has also
rejected the notion that the "right to fish" as mentioned in its state
constitution is a fundamental right.2" Alaska has specifically declared
commercial fishing is not a fundamental right.2' A federal court has even
held that the pursuit of a livelihood is not a fundamental right.22 The
overwhelming result in most states, then, is that fishing regulations must
pass only rational basis scrutiny by courts in order to be sustained.
16. Windsorv. Coggeshall, 169 A. 326,327 (R.I. 1933) (upholding interlocutory decree
requiring non-licensed fishermen to remove fish traps from certain territorial limits and
affirming that the state has the ability to regulate fisheries as it deems fit).
17. Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145, 158 (R.I. 1910) (requiring
negligent defendant to pay judgment given to a shellfish cultivator in lower court for
damages to his beds after an oil spill, despite claim that the cultivator was illegally on the
river beds).
18. See State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561,561 (1850) (upholding conviction of defendant for
stealing oysters from a private oyster bed in disobedience of a legislative restriction on oyster
harvesting during certain dates).
19. See Sisk v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dept., 644 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1981). The Texas
court's holding in Sisk (fishing is not a fundamental right) was adopted by Florida state
courts in 1990. Lane v. Chiles, 698 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1990).
20. California Gillnetters Ass'n v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1145, 1153-
1154 (1996).
21. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska
1980).
22. LaBauve v. La. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 444 F. Supp. 1370, 1382 (E.D. La.
1978).
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Likewise, fishermen have been deemed by federal courts as a non-suspect
class for the purposes of entertaining an equal protection challenge to
fishery regulation. 3 Such a classification also results in use of rational
basis scrutiny by the courts.
The California Supreme Court has held that "the legislature, for the
purpose of conserving and protecting fish, may pass such laws as to it seem
wise, and the question what measures are best adapted to that end are for
its determination. 2 4 Environmentally speaking, the states do have a duty
to conserve fish and wildlife and prevent them from extermination or undue
depletion.25 This duty relates back to the state's "ownership" of the
fisheries26 and its necessary prerogative to regulate for the "common benefit
of all its people," that is, to protect natural resources so that all of the
state's citizens have access to them.
27
The state thus enjoys great deference if regulating based on environ-
mental grounds; unless the statutes violate a constitutional provision, the
courts generally will not question the means of such legislation.28 Courts
will often construct laws in a manner reasonably suitable to fit their
intended purposes.2 9 Probably for this very reason, legislative regulation
of state fisheries has often dealt with commercial fishing, rather than with
sport fishing that normally results in a smaller catch.3" Finally, in Skiriotes
23. See Sisk v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 644 F.2d at 1058 (strict scrutiny test not
required to review the state's incongruent treatment of commercial fishermen, because this
group does not constitute a suspect class); see also Jensen v. United States, 743 F. Supp.
1091, 1114 (D. N.J. 1990) (full-time fishermen likewise not subject to strict scrutiny
protection under the law).
24. People v. Monterey Fish Products Co., 195 Cal. 548,563 (1925) (citations omitted).
25. See Lacoste v. Dep't of Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S. 545 (1924) (affirming
state legislation that imposed a severance tax on wild animals and their skins and classifying
the legislation as a valid exercise of state police power to preserve and protect wildlife for
the common benefit).
26. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
27. Lacoste v. Dep't of Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S. at 549. Also, the federal
government, with the passage of the Endangered Species Act in 1978, has taken a proactive
step towards the protection of animal species listed as endangered. Because of the inherent
conservation concerns, the Act imposes legal consequences for the taking of any listed
species. Federal agencies were thus ordered to look after the conservation of these species,
regardless of the cost. See Hanna Sanders, State of Maine v. Norton: Assessing the Role of
Judicial Notice, 9 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 125, 126-127 (2003).
28. See e.g., the research collected in AM. JUR.2D, supra note 10 (collecting cases); State
v. Philips, 70 So. 367 (Fla. 1925); State v. McCullagh, 153 P. 557 (Kan. 1915); People v.
Clair, 116 N.E. 868 (N.Y. 1917); State v. Hanlon, 82 N.E. 662 (Ohio 1907).
29. People v. Clair, 116 N.E. 868 (N.Y. 1917).
30. People v. Hamm suggests the reason for the disparity: commercial fishing is profit-
driven, and also has the technological capability to remove large numbers of fish. 595
N.E.2d 540, 544 (1992).
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v. Florida,3 the United States Supreme Court held that a Florida statute
that prohibited the use of diving gear by sponge harvesters withstood
constitutional scrutiny. Thus, state restrictions of certain types of fishing
gear have been sustained as a reasonable way to promote conservation
interests since at least the 1940s.32
This deference to legislative fishery regulations has led to a national rift
between commercial fishermen and conservationists coupled with recrea-
tional fishermen. While the latter group argues that many of the methods
of commercial fishing severely deplete the nation's fisheries and kill an
excess of marine life, the former argue that the real issue is simply one of
resource allocation-an attempt to push over more resources to recreational
fishermen.33
I. THE CHERENZIA DECISION
In Cherenzia v. Lynch, several commercial fishermen brought an action
in Rhode Island to challenge the constitutionality of legislation prohibiting
the use of SCUBA gear in four coastal ponds in the state.34 In particular,
the fishermen argued that the statute violated their rights of equal
protection and due process.35 After a superior court motion justice granted
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,36 the defendant appealed to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment, leaving the
statute to "sink or swim on its own merits as a legislated public policy."37
The plaintiffs advanced a number of arguments on appeal. They
generally submitted that the statute violated their "rights of fishery," as
written in the Rhode Island Constitution.38 They specifically argued that
31. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
32. Marlene K. Stem, Judicial Activism in Enforcement of Florida's Net Ban, 15 J.
LAND USE & ENVTh. LAW 55, 88 (1999).
33. See, e.g., John Alton Duff & William C. Harrison, The Law, Policy, and Politics of
Gillnet Restrictions in State Waters of the Gulf of Mexico, 9 ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW 389,
389-390 (1997). A law banning the use of gillnets in the Gulf of Mexico has been a
particularly controversial subject recently. This article explores the environmental concerns
leading to the creation of such legislation and the particular gillnet restrictions for each state
on the Gulf of Mexico. The article also discusses the ramifications of such legislation and
proposes suggestions for states to take into account when legislating regarding fishery rights.
34. 847 A.2d 818 (R.I. 2004).
35. Id. at 822.
36. Id. at 820. On cross-motions for summary judgment, "the motion justice ruled that
the General Assembly did not have a rational basis for 'depriving [SCUBA-diving
fishermen] of their occupation' and that the statute was thus unconstitutional." Id. at 821.
37. Id. at 820.
38. The text of the Rhode Island Constitution provides:
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their constitutional rights to equal protection and due process were
violated.39 They challenged the statute on the basis that it "arbitrarily dis-
criminates against a single class of fishermen-those using SCUBA."'
Furthermore, they argued that there is no legitimate state interest tied to the
statute because "such fishing does not implicate resource sustainability or
public-health concerns."'" Particularly, because all commercial fishermen
are bound to a catch-quota that limits the size of a daily harvest, they con-
tended that the General Assembly "lacked a justifiable resource-sustain-
ability goal in enacting" the statute. 2 As a result, they offered that the
statute is "an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of legislative power.""
The State advanced a number of arguments revolving around the
plenary power given to states to regulate fishing. It contended that it was
the duty of the General Assembly to forge a compromise between the
commercial fishermen and the recreational fishermen." Furthermore, the
state argued that "the statute enjoys a presumption of validity" and that the
plaintiffs did not meet the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt.45 Finally, the State refuted the allegation that
the statute violated equal protection or due process rights because no
fundamental right was infringed and the statute could pass a minimal-
scrutiny test.46
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery, and the
privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled under the charter
and usages of this state, including ... fishing from the shore... and they shall be
secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state
with due regard for the preservation of their values; and it shall be the duty of the
general assembly to provide for the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal,
mineral and other natural resources of the state, and to adopt all means necessary and
proper by law to protect the natural environment of the people of the state by
providing adequate resource planning for the control and regulation of the use of the
natural resources of the state and for the preservation, regeneration and restoration of
the natural environment of the state.
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
39. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 822.
40. Id. at 820. The fishermen further relied on the Opinion to the Senate where the
justices noted that a legislative act would be discriminatory if it "'permit[ted] one class of
citizens to take these fish while prohibiting entirely the taking thereof by another class of
citizens, as for example those who resort to fishery for commercial purposes .... ' Id. at
824-825 (quoting Opinion to the Senate (Re: Resolution S-401), 137 A.2d 525,526 (1958)).
41. Id. at 822.
42. Id. at 825.
43. Id. at 822.
44. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 821.
45. Id. at 822.
46. Id. The State classified the measure as "economic and environmental-protection
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Focusing heavily on the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge, the
Cherenzia court began its analysis by citing Kennedy v. State47 and Boucher
v. Sayeed48 to demonstrate that "not all legislative classifications, however,
are impermissible"49 and that the legislature "enjoys a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws that affect some classes of citizens differently
from others."5 The court opined that because the statute prohibits any
person from the use of SCUBA, rather than just commercial fishermen, the
legislation was not aimed at only one class of citizens and thus was far from
a "sweeping prohibition."'" The court also declared that the provisions of
the statute do not violate any fundamental constitutional right.52 Specifi-
cally, the court stated that there is no fundamental constitutional right to
harvest shellfish by using any specific method.53 The court also empha-
sized the limited nature of the measure in its regulation of only four coastal
ponds, therefore not depriving fishermen of their ability to make a living or
infringing on any constitutional rights of fishery. 4 Using the opportunity
to define the rights of fishery, the court relied on Rhode Island precedent
and declared that the scope of the right protected in the Rhode Island
constitution is that all people of the state, residents and commercial fisher-
men alike, share fishery resources in equal access.55
Without dissent, the court found that the provisions of the statute
passed a subsequent minimum-scrutiny test.56 The court suggested that
such a measure may prevent future depletion, as well as promote an
equitable distribution of the resource among citizens, 57 and that restricting
the most efficient means of fishing would help to do so.58 Finally, the court
legislation." Id. at 821.
47. Kennedy v. State, 654 A.2d 708 (R.I. 1995).
48. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983).
49. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 823 (quoting Kennedy v. State, 654 A.2d at 712).
50. Id. (quoting Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d at 91).
51. Id. at 825.
52. Id. at 823.
53. Id. at 824. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
54. Id.
55. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 824 (quoting Opinion to the Senate, 137 A.2d 525,
525-526 (R.I. 1958)). The court also interpreted the Rhode Island constitution as
anticipating legislative regulation to regulate the fisheries, as the right to fishery is not an
unqualified right. Id.
56. Id. at 826.
57. Id. at 825.
58. Id. at 826. The court discounted the existing daily catch limits in place in the name
of the legislative duty to "preserve the state fishery resources for all the inhabitants of the
state, even those who seek, for example, merely to harvest shellfish for their own personal
recreation and consumption." ld.
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noted that the regulation would prevent the possibility of boating accidents
and personal injury to divers. 9
The court then quickly dismissed the plaintiffs' substantive due process
claim by reiterating the lack of an implicated fundamental right of the
fishermen, and the reasonable safety concerns that the General Assembly
possessed in passing the measure.'
IV. ASSESSING REGULATIONS ON COMMERCIAL FISHING
The decision in Cherenzia v. Lynch is one example of the uphill battle
that commercial fisherman face when challenging the constitutionality of
fishery regulations. Because a fundamental right to fish will rarely be
found, state legislation must only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest.61 The primary shortcoming of the Cherenzia decision, how-
ever, is the extent to which the court allowed the General Assembly to
focus on the policy of resource allocation in a measure only marginally
related to conservation. In allowing such a restriction on commercial
fishermen, the court created the possibility that other hasty legislation may
be passed in the future which could negatively impact commercial fisher-
men.
The court noted that the Legislature is charged with "the [constitu-
tional] 'duty' to conserve and protect the state's fishery resources" ;62
however, a threat to the shellfish population was noticeably absent in the
facts of the case. The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Manage-
ment's Fish and Wildlife Division had set quantity limits for shellfish
catches at the ponds in question.63 Furthermore, according to the plaintiffs'
expert witness, "certain shellfish in this area spawn prolifically, and
harvesting poses no danger to their population-as long as those who are
fishing there observe the size and catch limitations."'  The State's
contention that the General Assembly must "preserve the state fishery
resources for all the inhabitants of the state" 65 made little sense considering
that the shellfish in the area appeared to be in no danger, present or future.
Although Rhode Island's constitution charges the legislature to provide
"adequate resource planning for the control and regulation of the use of the
59. Id. at 825.
60. Id. at 826.
61. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
62. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 825 (citing R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17).
63. Id. at 820.
64. ld. at 821.
65. Id. at 826.
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natural resources of the state and [to provide] for the preservation,
regeneration and restoration of the natural environment, ' 66 the former
consideration appears to have trumped the latter. Without any concrete
scientific evidence, the General Assembly created a compromise between
the commercial fishermen using SCUBA, and the residents who com-
plained of depleted shellfish stocks and interference with their recreational
boating. Rather than supporting the long-standing Rhode Island policy of
providing equal benefit of the fisheries to the public,67 this measure sounds
remarkably like an attempt to appease Rhode Island recreational fishermen
by stifling their competition. With plenty of other options to adequately
allocate fishery resources and protect public safety (restrict hours of
boating, restrict hours of SCUBA fishing, etc.), this measure borders on
arbitrary.
Only a few decades ago, the United States Supreme Court held that a
state could not prohibit out-of-state persons from accessing the state's
fisheries by merely citing resource conservation as its basis for denying
access.68 The Court opined:
a statute that leaves a State's residents free to destroy a natural
resource while excluding aliens or nonresidents is not a conserva-
tion law at all. It bears repeating that a "state may not use its
admitted power to protect the health and safety of its people as a
basis for suppressing competition." A State cannot escape this
principle by cloaking objectionable legislation in the currently
fashionable garb of environmental protection.69
The Cherenzia decision seemed to be engaging in the same discrimina-
tion--competition regulation "cloaked" in the garb of resource sustain-
ability and police power. Only this time, it pitted state residents against
state residents.
Furthermore, the court used flawed logic in determining that the Rhode
Island statute was free of a suspect classification. The court justified the
measure in that "this statute prohibits any person-not just commercial
fishermen-from using only one type of available means from harvesting
shellfish (namely, SCUBA) and from doing so in four named coastal
ponds. '70 How many residential citizens, however, use SCUBA gear? The
66. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (emphasis added).
67. See, e.g., State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561 (1850).
68. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 285 (1977) (quoting H.P. Hood
& Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949)).
69. Id.
70. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d at 825.
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statute unfairly targets the methods used almost exclusively by commercial
fishermen.
Ultimately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court admittedly took away the
most economically feasible way for commercial fishermen to harvest
shellfish from these four significant coastal ponds. Ironically, with catch
limits in effect, a ban of SCUBA gear seemed quite unnecessary. Other
states have promulgated legislation restricting the gear commercial
fishermen can use, effectively driving them out of business. When the
Washington Supreme Court banned commercial salmon fishermen from
using sports gear, the State admitted that "the effect of this statute will be
to reduce the number of commercial fishermen."'" In addition, only one
state, Florida, has chosen to set an example of compensating fisherman who
experience economic loss from such restrictions.72 The State created
retroactive unemployment coverage for fishermen after a constitutional gill
net ban drove them out of business.73 Undoubtedly, the Rhode Island
statute will lead to at least a few unemployed commercial fishermen, and
broader future regulation could decimate their livelihood.
Fisheries are indeed limited resources, and the state no doubt has a
legitimate purpose to conserve its resources. The Cherenzia court, how-
ever, erred by supporting legislative fishery regulation based only margin-
ally on conservation concerns. By affirming a legislative policy that
covertly acts to decrease competition for recreational fishermen, the court
gave carte blanche for further measures that could be much more drastic
than those presented in this case. The court should have affirmed the
decision of the lower court, sending a message to the Legislature that their
policy affects the livelihood of the state's commercial fishermen, and
leaves these men and women of the Ocean State feeling disenfranchised
and underrepresented.
71. Wash. Kelpers Ass'n v. Washington, 502 P.2d 1170, 1180 (Wash. 1972) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting).
72. Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Note and Comment, Compensation for Commercial
Fishermen in the Wake of the 1994 ConstitutionalAmendment Limiting Marine Net Fishing,
20 NOVA L. REV. 559, 583 (Fall, 1995).
73. Id.
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